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1 Introduction
Frege in [13, § 68] wrote: Ich setze voraus, dass man wisse, was der Umfang eines Be-
griffes sei.1 Dummett’s diagnosis of the failure of Frege’s logicist project in the final
chapter of [8] focusses on the adoption of classical quantification over domains comprised
of objects falling under an indefinitely extensible concept. He repudiates the classical view
as illegitimate and puts forward reasons in favor of an intuitionistic interpretation of quan-
tification. Solomon Feferman, in recent years, has argued that the Continuum Hypothesis
(CH) might not be a definite mathematical problem (see [10, 11, 12]2).
My reason for that is that the concept of arbitrary set essential to its formu-
lation is vague or underdetermined and there is no way to sharpen it without
violating what it is supposed to be about. In addition, there is considerable
circumstantial evidence to support the view that CH is not definite. ([10, p.1]).
In particular the power set, P(A), of a given set A may be considered to be an indefinite
collection whose members are subsets of A, but whose exact extent is indeterminate (open-
ended). In [10], Feferman proposed a logical framework for what’s definite and for what’s
not.
1Translation: I assume that it is known what the extension of a concept is.
2Incidentally, the paper [10] was written for Peter Koellner’s Exploring the frontiers of incompleteness
(EFI) Project, Harvard 2011-2012.
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One way of saying of a statement ϕ that it is definite is that it is true or false;
on a deflationary account of truth that’s the same as saying that the Law of
Excluded Middle (LEM) holds of ϕ , i.e. one has ϕ∨¬ϕ . Since LEM is rejected
in intuitionistic logic as a basic principle, that suggests the slogan, “What’s
definite is the domain of classical logic, what’s not is that of intuitionistic
logic.” [...] And in the case of set theory, where every set is conceived to be a
definite totality, we would have classical logic for bounded quantification while
intuitionistic logic is to be used for unbounded quantification. ([10, p. 23])
At the end of [10] he made that idea more precise by suggesting semi-intuitionistic set the-
ories as frameworks for formulating questions of definiteness and studying the definiteness
of specific set-theoretic statements. In relation to CH, he conjectured that this statement
is not definite in the specific case of a semi-intuitionistic set theory T, in the sense that
T does not prove CH ∨ ¬CH. The set-theoretical point of view expressed by T accepts
the definiteness of the continuum in its guise as the arithmetical/geometric structure of
the real line, but does not allow the powerset operation to be applied to arbitrary sets.
The objective of this paper is to prove Feferman’s conjecture. In this sense it is a
technical paper. It lays out new evidence for the reader to consider. However, as far as
the ongoing discussions of the foundational status of CH are concerned, readers will have
to form their own conclusions.
A chief technique applied in this article is realizability over relativized constructible
hierarchies combined with forcing. More widely the impression is that CH is not an isolated
case in that other statements could be proved to be indefinite relative to semi-intuitionistic
set theories in this way. At any rate, it appears that the paper adds a hitherto unexplored
tool to the weaponry earmarked for engineering specific realizability models and proving
independence results.
An outline of the paper of the paper reads as follows: Section 2 introduces formal
systems of semi-intuitionistic set theory and in particular the theory T. Section 3 is
devoted to the relativized constructible hierarchy L[A] and its properties. In section 4,
L[A] features as a domain of computation which gets utilized in section 5 as a realizability
universe for T. By carefully designing sets of ordinals C and E and employing results
from forcing, realizability of T over L[C] and L[C ∪E] yields conflicting information that
leads to a contradiction, and thus provides a proof of the desired conjecture.
2 Semi-intuitionistic set theory
The study of subsystems of ZF formulated in intuitionistic logic with Bounded Separation
was apparently initiated by Pozsgay [20, 21] and then pursued more systematically by
Tharp [28], Friedman [14] and Wolf [30]. These systems are actually semi-intuitionistic as
they contain the law of excluded middle for bounded formulae.
Classical Kripke-Platek set theory, KP, is an important theory that accommodates a
great deal of set theory. Its transitive models, called admissible sets, have been a major
source of interaction between model theory, recursion theory and set theory (cf. [3]). KP
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arises from ZF by completely omitting the power set axiom and restricting separation and
collection to bounded formulae. Here we are interested in its intuitionistic cousin.
Definition 2.1 Intuitionistic Kripke-Platek set theory, IKP, is formulated in the usual
language of set theory containing ∈ as the only non-logical symbol besides =. Formulae
are built from prime formulae a ∈ b and a = b by use of propositional connectives and
quantifiers ∀x,∃x. Quantifiers of the forms ∀x ∈ a, ∃x ∈ a are called bounded. Bounded
or ∆0-formulae are the formulae wherein all quantifiers are bounded. IKP is based on
intuitionistic logic and has the following non-logical axioms: Extensionality, Pair, Union,
Infinity (in the specific version that there is a smallest set containing the empty set 0 and
closed under the successor operation, x′ = x ∪ {x}), Bounded Separation
∃x∀u [u ∈ x↔ (u ∈ a ∧ ϕ(u))]
for all bounded formulae ϕ(u), Bounded Collection
∀x ∈ a∃y ψ(x, y) → ∃z ∀x ∈ a∃y ∈ z ψ(x, y)
for all bounded formulae ψ(x, y), and Set Induction
∀x [(∀y ∈ x θ(y))→ θ(x)]→ ∀x θ(x)
for all formulae θ(x).
Feferman in [9] proceeded to add several further schemata to the axioms of IKP. The
most basic principle that he added follows from the idea that in semi-constructive set
theory each set is considered to be a definite totality. As a consequence of ∆0 separation
one obtains a restricted Law of Excluded Middle:
(∆0−LEM) ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ, for all ∆0-formulae ϕ.
Markov’s principle in the form
(MP) ¬¬∃xϕ→ ∃xϕ, for all ∆0 formulae ϕ
is another principle that is frequently added in this context.
Some further principles that are considered in [9] are (BOS) and ACSet.
(BOS) ∀x ∈ a [ϕ(x) ∨ ¬ϕ(x)]→ [∀x ∈ aϕ(x) ∨ ∃x ∈ a¬ϕ(x)]
for all formulae ϕ(x).
(ACSet) ∀x ∈ a∃y ψ(x, y)→ ∃f [Fun(f) ∧ dom(f) = a ∧ ∀x ∈ aϕ(x, f(x))]
for all formulae ψ(x, y), where Fun(f) expresses in the usual set-theoretic form that f is
a function, and dom(f) = a expresses that the domain of f is the set a.
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Feferman [9, Theorem 6] shows that SCS := IKP+(∆0−LEM)+(MP)+(BOS)+(ACSet)
has the same proof-theoretic strength as KP (and therefore the same as IKP). His proof
uses a functional interpretation. The same result can be obtained via a realizability
interpretation using codes for Σ1 partial recursive set functions as realizers along the lines
of Tharp’s 1971 arcticle [28].
Remark 2.2 (i) SCS proves the full replacement schema of ZF. Moreover, SCS
proves strong collection, i.e. all formulae
∀x ∈ a∃y ϕ(x, y)→ ∃z [∀x ∈ a∃y ∈ z ϕ(x, y) ∧ ∀y ∈ z ∃x ∈ aϕ(x, y)]
where ϕ(x, y) is an arbitrary formula.
Strong collection is an axiom schema of Constructive Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory,
CZF (cf. [1, 2]) and also of Tharp’s set theory [28].
(ii) SCS is a subtheory of Tharp’s semi-intuitionistic set theory IZF [28], for if ∀x ∈
a∃y ϕ(x, y) holds, then there is a set d such that ∀x ∈ a∃z ∈ d∃y[z = 〈x, y〉 ∧ϕ(x, y)]
and ∀z ∈ d∃x ∈ a∃y[z = 〈x, y〉 ∧ ϕ(x, y)] using (strong) collection, and by axiom
6 of IZF, d is the surjective image of an ordinal, i.e., there is an ordinal α and a
function g with domain α and range d. Thus d is a set of ordered pairs. Now define
a function f with domain a by letting f(x) be the second projection of g(ξ) where
ξ is the least ordinal < α such that the first projection of g(ξ) equals x.
As it turns out, some of the axioms of SCS are redundant.
Proposition 2.3 IKP+ (ACSet) proves (∆0−LEM) and (BOS).
Proof: First we prove (∆0−LEM), using Diaconescu’s old constructions [7]. Let 0 be the
empty set, 1 := {0} and A = {0, 1}. Note that (intuitionistically) ∀x, y ∈ A [x = y∨x 6= y]
(where x 6= y abbreviates ¬x = y) since 0 6= 1 as 0 ∈ 1 and 0 /∈ 0. Suppose ϕ is ∆0. Define
a := {n ∈ A | n = 0 ∨ [n = 1 ∧ ϕ]} and b := {n ∈ A | n = 1 ∨ [n = 0 ∧ ϕ]}. a and b are
sets by ∆0 separation. Obviously we have
∀z ∈ {a, b} ∃k ∈ A k ∈ z
since 0 ∈ a and 1 ∈ b. So we may apply (ACSet) to obtain a function f with domain {a, b}
such that f(a), f(b) ∈ A. We thus have f(a) = f(b) or ¬(f(a) = f(b)). In the first case,
we can infer that φ. In the second case, we have a 6= b. As ϕ implies a = b, we get ¬ϕ.
To show (BOS) assume
∀x ∈ a [ψ(x) ∨ ¬ψ(x)],
where ψ(x) is an arbitrary formula. Thus,
∀x ∈ a∃y [(ψ(x) ∧ y = 0) ∨ (¬ψ(x) ∧ y = 1)].
With the help of (ACSet) there is a function f with domain a such that
∀x ∈ a [(ψ(x) ∧ f(x) = 0) ∨ (¬ψ(x) ∧ f(x) = 1)] (1)
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and hence ∀x ∈ a [f(x) = 0) ∨ f(x) = 1]. Using (∆0−LEM) we have ∃x ∈ a f(x) = 1 or
∀x ∈ a f(x) = 0. In the former case we deduce ∃x ∈ a¬ψ(x) from (1), whereas in the
latter case we infer that ∀x ∈ aψ(x). ⊓⊔
Definition 2.4 Let T be the theory
SCS+ ‘R is a set’
where SCS is from Definition 2.1 and ‘R is a set’ asserts that the reals, R, form a set.
Since SCS has classical logic for ∆0 formulae it is not necessary to pay much attention to
the question of how the reals are actually formalized as is so often the case in intuitionistic
contexts. Thus, any of the following equivalent statements could be used to formalize the
existence of R as a set:
• The collection of all functions from N to N, NN, is a set.
• The collection of all subsets of N is a set.
Remark 2.5 The proof-theoretic strength of T resides strictly between full classical sec-
ond order arithmetic and Zermelo set theory. In particular all theorems of classical second
order arithmetic are theorems of T and all theorems of T are theorems of Zermelo set
theory plus the axiom of choice.
The continuum hypothesis, CH, is the statement that every infinite set of reals is
either in one-one correspondence with N or with R. More formally, this can be expressed
as follows:
∀x ⊆ R [x 6= ∅ → (∃f f : ω ։ x ∨ ∃f f : x։ R)]
where f : y ։ z signifies that f is a surjective function with domain y and co-domain z.
Conjecture 2.6 (Feferman) T does not prove CH ∨ ¬CH.
When one ponders how to prove the conjecture one of the first ideas that comes to
mind is that intuitionistic set theories S very often have the disjunction property, i.e.,
if S ⊢ ψ ∨ θ then S ⊢ ψ or S ⊢ θ (cf. [24, 25]). If this property held for T it would
certainly settle the conjecture in the affirmative. However, T being semi-intuitionistic,
the disjunction property does not hold for it. The technique of realizability certainly
springs to mind when tackling such problems and consequently one would like to show
that there is a realizability interpretation of T that has no realizer for CH ∨ ¬CH. There
are several essentially different forms of realizability for set theories to choose from (cf.
[4, 5, 14, 18, 19, 23, 22, 24, 25, 26, 28]). Moreover, what should the realizers be and how
should the realizability universe be defined?
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3 The relativized constructible hierarchy
Later we shall look at realizability interpretations in the relativized constructible hierarchy.
The latter comes in two versions: For a set A we have L(A) and L[A]. L(A) is the smallest
inner model that contains A. In L(A), the transitive closure of A is added at level 0 and
for higher levels the definition is the same as for L, whereas in L[A] A acts as an additional
predicate for defining sets. The two hierarchies can be quite different. E.g., in general
L(A) is not a model of the axiom of choice, AC, whereas L[A] is always a model of AC.
Another difference is that L[R] = L whereas L 6= L(R) when R /∈ L.3 Only L[A] is
interesting for the purposes of this paper.
Definition 3.1 Let L∈ be the language of set theory and L∈(P ) be its augmentation
by a unary predicate symbol P . Let A be a set. Any set X gives rise to a structure
〈X,∈, A ∩X〉 for L∈(P ) with domain X where the elementhood symbol is interpreted by
the elementhood relation restricted toX×X and P is interpreted as A∩X. Thereby A acts
as a unary predicate on X. A subset Y of X is said to be definable in 〈X,∈, A∩X〉 if there
is a formula ϕ(x, y1, . . . , yr) of L∈(P ) with all free variables exhibited and b1, . . . , br ∈ X
such that for all a ∈ X,
a ∈ Y iff 〈X,∈, A ∩X〉 |= ϕ(a, b1, . . . , br),
where of course 〈X,∈, A ∩ X〉 |= ϕ(a, b1, . . . , br) signifies that ϕ holds in the structure
under the variable assignment x 7→ a and yi 7→ bi.
The sets Lα[A] are defined by recursion on α as follows:
(i) DefA(X) := {Y ⊆ X | Y definable in 〈X,∈, A ∩X〉}.
(ii) L0[A] = ∅.
(iii) Lα+1[A] = Def
A(Lα[A]).
(iv) Lλ =
⋃
ξ<λ Lξ[A] for limits λ.
(v) L[A] =
⋃
α Lα[A].
The next proposition lists some important properties of Lα[A]. Bounded quantifiers are
of the form ∀x ∈ y and ∃x ∈ y. A bounded or ∆0 formula of L∈(P ) is a formula in which
all quantifiers appear bounded. A formula of L∈(P ) of the form ∃zϕ(z) (∀zϕ(z)) with
ϕ bounded is said to be Σ1 (Π1). Let α > 0. A relation on Lα[A] is said to be Σ
Lα[A]
1
(Π
Lα[A]
1 ) if it is definable (with parameters) on the structure 〈Lα[A],∈, A ∩ Lα[A]〉 via a
Σ1 (Π1) formula of L∈(P ). A relation on Lα[A] is ∆
Lα[A]
1 if it is both Σ
Lα[A]
1 and Π
Lα[A]
1 .
For a set X, |X| denotes the cardinality of X. For further unexplained notions and
proofs see [6, II. pp. 102–104] or [15, 17].
3Note that in the buildup of L[R], R is just used as a predicate. By identifying R with the set of all
functions from N to N, this is merely the predicate of being such a function, which is ∆0 in N, hence
absolute. Thus nothing outside of L can be generated in this way.
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Proposition 3.2 1. α ≤ β ⇒ Lα[A] ⊆ Lβ[A].
2. α < β ⇒ Lα[A] ∈ Lβ[A].
3. Lα[A] is transitive.
4. L[A] ∩ α = Lα[A] ∩ α = α.
5. For α ≥ ω, |Lα[A]| = |α|.
6. L[A] |= ZF.
7. ν 7→ Lν [A] is uniformly ∆
Lλ[A]
1 for limits λ > ω.
8. B = A ∩ L[A] ⇒ L[A] = L[B] ∧ (V = L[B])L[A].
9. There is a Σ1 formula wo(x, y, z) such that
KP ⊢ “{〈x, y〉 | wo(x, y, a)} is a wellordering of L[a]”
and if <L[A] denotes the wellordering of L[A] determined by wo, then for any limit
λ > ω,
<L[A] ∩L[A]× L[A] is Σ
Lλ[A]
1 .
10. L[A] is model of AC.
11. λ > ω limit ∧ B = A ∩ Lλ[A] ⇒ Lλ[A] = Lλ[B].
4 Computability over L[A]
In this section we develop the recursion theory of partial Σ
L[A]
1 functions, that is functions
(not necessarily everywhere defined) whose graphs are Σ
L[A]
1 . Below we shall write Lα[A] |=
ϕ rather than the more correct 〈Lα[A],∈, Lα[A]∩A〉 |= ϕ. Likewise, 〈L[A],∈, L[A]∩A〉 |= ϕ
will be shortened to L[A] |= ϕ.
Definition 4.1 〈a, b〉 denotes the ordered pair of two sets a and b. If c is an ordered pair
〈a, b〉 let (c)0 = a and (c)1 = b. If c is not an ordered pair let (c)0 = (c)1 = 0. we also
define ordered n-tuples via 〈a1〉 := a1 and 〈a1, . . . , an, an+1〉 := 〈〈a1, . . . , an〉, an+1〉.
It’s standard procedure to assign to each formula ψ of L∈(P ) a Go¨del number ψ such
that ψ is a hereditarily definable set, for instance by using the pairing function a, b 7→
〈a, b〉. There is a formula Sat(v,w) of L∈(P ) such that for all ∆0 formulae θ(x1, . . . , xn)
of L∈(P ), not involving other free variables, the following holds for any limit λ > ω and
all ~a = a1, . . . , an ∈ Lλ[A]:
Lλ |= θ(~a ) iff Lλ |= Sat(θ , 〈~a 〉). (2)
Moreover, Sat is uniformly ∆Lλ[A]1 for limits λ > ω (see [6, II]).
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Now let λ be a limit > ω. For e, a1, . . . , an ∈ Lλ[A] define
[e]Lλ[A]n (a1, . . . , an) ≃ b (3)
if e is an ordered pair 〈ψ , c〉 with ψ being a ∆0 formula of L∈(P ), not involving free
variables other than x1, . . . , xn+2, such that
Lλ[A] |= Sat(ψ , 〈a1, . . . , an, c, d〉) (4)
and (d)0 = b, where d is the <L[A]-least ordered pair satisfying (4).
Likewise, [e]L[A]n (a1, . . . , an) ≃ b is defined by replacing Lλ[A] by L[A] in the foregoing
definition.
Lemma 4.2 Let τ > ω be a limit of limits, i.e.,
∀ξ < τ ∃λ < τ [ξ < λ ∧ λ limit].
(i) For e ∈ Lτ [A], the partial function f on Lτ [A] given by
f(a1, . . . , an) = b iff [e]
Lτ [A]
n (a1, . . . , an) ≃ b
is Σ
Lτ [A]
1 (uniformly for all such τ).
(ii) For every n-ary partial Σ
Lτ [A]
1 function f there exists an index e ∈ Lτ [A] such that,
for all a1, . . . , an ∈ Lτ [A],
f(a1, . . . , an) = b iff [e]
Lτ [A]
n (a1, . . . , an) ≃ b.
(iii) (i) and (ii) hold with L[A] in place of Lτ [A].
(iv) [e]
Lτ [A]
n (a1, . . . , an) ≃ b implies [e]
L[A]
n (a1, . . . , an) ≃ b and [e]
Lλ[A]
n (a1, . . . , an) ≃ b for
all limits λ > τ .
(v) If [e]L[A]n (a1, . . . , an) ≃ b then [e]
Lλ[A]
n (a1, . . . , an) ≃ b for some limit λ.
Proof: (i) First note that by Proposition 3.2 the relation <L[A] restricted to Lλ[A] is
ΣLλ[A]1 for all limits λ > ω. Thus the <L[A]-leastness of d with respect to (4) can be
expressed by
∃λ < τ [λ limit > ω ∧ a1, . . . , an, c, d ∈ Lλ[A]
∧Lλ[A] |= Sat(ϑ , 〈a1, . . . , an, c, d〉)
∀u ∈ Lλ[A](u <L[A] d → Lλ[A] |= Sat(¬ϑ , 〈a1, . . . , an, c, u〉))],
which is clearly Σ
Lτ [A]
1 .
(ii) Since f is Σ
Lτ [A]
1 there is a Σ1 formula ∃xn+3ϑ0(x1, . . . , xn+3) of L∈(P ) and a parameter
c ∈ Σ
Lτ [A]
1 (several parameters can be coded as one) such that
f(a1, . . . , an) = b iff Lτ [A] |= ∃xn+3ϑ0(a1, . . . , an, c, b, xn+3).
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Now let
ϑ(x1, . . . , xn+2) ≡ ϑ0(x1, . . . , xn+1, (xn+2)0, (xn+2)1).
Then
f(a1, . . . , an) = b iff Lτ [A] |= ϑ0(a1, . . . , an, c, (d)0, (d)1] and (d)0 = b,
where d is the <L[A]-least u such that Lτ [A] |= ϑ0[a1, . . . , an, c, (u)0, (u)1]. Hence, with
e = 〈ϑ , c〉, we have f(a1, . . . , an) = b iff [e]
Lτ [A]
n (a1, . . . , an) ≃ b.
(iii) is proved in the same way as (i) and (ii).
(iv) follows since Σ1 statements are upward persistent.
(v) follows since the statement is of Σ1 form. ⊓⊔
In several respects the recursion theory of partial ΣL[A]1 functions and partial Σ
Lτ [A]
1
functions (for τ being a limit of limits) shares similarities with ordinary recursion theory
over ω. In particular, the analogues of the S-m-n theorem and the recursion theorem hold.
5 Realizability over L[A]
L[A] will be employed as a realizability universe. There is a germane notion of realizability
where realizers are indices of partial Σ
L[A]
1 functions.
Definition 5.1 For d ∈ L[A] and set-theoretic sentences ψ with parameters from L[A]
we define the realizability relation d A ψ.
Below we shall write [e]L[A](~a ) A ψ rather than the more accurate
∃u ∈ L[A]([e]L[A]n (~a ) ≃ u ∧ u A ψ]
where ~a = a1, . . . , an. It will also assumed that all quantifiers range over L[A].
e A c ∈ d iff c ∈ d
e A c = d iff c = d
e A ϕ ∧ ψ iff (e)0 A ϕ and (e)1 A ψ
e A ϕ ∨ ψ iff [(e)0 = 0 ∧ (e)1 A ϕ] or [(e)0 = 1 ∧ (e)1 A ψ]
e A ϕ→ ψ iff ∀a [a A ϕ ⇒ [e]
L[A](a) A ψ]
e A ∃xθ(x) iff (e)1 A θ((e)0)
e A ∀xθ(x) iff ∀a [e]
L[A](a) A θ(a).
Occasionally we shall write A ψ for ∃e ∈ L[A] e A ψ.
Theorem 5.2 (Realizability Theorem) Let RL[A] be the set of real numbers in the
sense of L[A]. If ψ(x1, . . . , xn) is a formula of set theory, with all free variables among
the exhibited, and D is a proof of ψ(x1, . . . , xn) in T, then one can effectively construct
a hereditarily finite set eD which only depends on D (and not on A) such that for all
a1, . . . , an ∈ L[A],
[eD]
L[A](a1, . . . , an,R
L[A]) A ψ(a1, . . . , an). (5)
9
Proof: With little modification, the proof of Tharp’s realizability theorem [28] carries
over to show this realizabilty theorem. This is similar to Tharp’s realizability theorem
[28]. It can also be gleaned from the proofs of the realizability theorems [26, Theorems
3.7-3.9], using considerable simplifications of the proofs brought about by the fact that
there is uniform ΣL[A]1 selection function, i.e., there exists a hereditarily finite set eac such
that for all A and nonempty sets a, [eac]
L[A](a) ∈ a. ⊓⊔
6 Designing L[C]
In order to show that CH∨¬CH is not deducible in T we intend to employ Theorem 5.2.
Aiming at a contradiction, we assume we have a derivation D of CH∨¬CH in T and thus
a hereditarily finite set eD such that
[eD](R
L[A]) A CH ∨ ¬CH (6)
holds for all sets A. To refute this, we intend to carefully design a counterexample C.4
We shall start from a set-theoretic universe V0 such that
V0 |= ZFC+ 2
ℵ0 = ℵ2.
V0 can be obtained from any universe V
′ such that V ′ |= ZFC+GCH (e.g. L) by forcing
with Fn(κ × ω, 2), where the latter denotes the set of all finite functions with domain
⊂ κ × ω and range 2 and κ = (ℵ2)
V ′ , i.e., κ is ℵ2 in the sense of V
′ (see [16, VII.5.14]).
Now let RV0 be the reals in the sense of V0. We would like to pick a set C ∈ V0 such that
R
V0 ∈ L[C]. We cannot choose C to be RV0 since L[RV0 ] = L (cf. footnote 3) and therefore
R
V0 /∈ L[RV0 ]. But since V0 satisfies AC there is an injective function F in V0 with domain
R
V0 whose range is a set of ordinals. Identifying RV0 with the set {g ∈ V0 | g : N→ N}, let
C = {ωF (g)+2 + ω · g(n) + n | g ∈ RV0}. (7)
Then C is a set of ordinals in V0 and, owing to the uniqueness of the Cantor normal form,
R
V0 is definable from C in L[C]. The latter entails that RV0 ∈ L[C] and thus
R
V0 = RL[C]. (8)
As a result, L[C] 6|= CH and therefore
for all d ∈ L[C], d 6A CH. (9)
The assumption (6) implies that there exists b ∈ L[C] such that L[C] |= [eD](R
L[C]) ≃ b.
Moreover, (6) and (9) entail that
(b)0 = 1. (10)
4Note that there are sets A,A′ and hereditarily finite sets e, e′ such that [e]L[A](RL[A]) A CH and
[e′]L[A
′](RL[A
′]) A′ ¬CH, and hence sets A such that [e
′′]L[A](RL[A]) A CH ∨¬CH for some hereditarily
finite e′′.
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We can now pick a sufficiently large limit ordinal ρ such that C ∈ Lρ[C], R
V0 ∈ Lρ[C] and
b ∈ Lρ[C]. By Lemma 4.2(v) we can also arrange that
Lρ[C] |= [eD](R
L[C]) ≃ b. (11)
Moreover, from Lemma 4.2(iv) and Proposition 3.2(11) it follows that for every set of
ordinals B with B ∩ ρ = ∅ we have
L[C ∪B] |= [eD](R
L[C]) ≃ b. (12)
The next step consists in taking a forcing extension V1 of V0 which does not pick up new
real numbers but satisfies V1 |= 2
ℵ0 = ℵ1, i.e.,
R
V0 = RV1 ∧ (ℵ1)
V0 = (ℵ1)
V1 ∧ V1 |= CH. (13)
The latter can be arranged by forcing with
P := (Fn(ℵ1,ℵ2,ℵ1))
V0
i.e., the set of functions f ∈ V0 which are countable in V0 with domain contained in (ℵ1)
V0
and range contained in (ℵ2)
V0 . That (13) holds follows, e.g., from [16, Ch.VII,6.13,6.14,6.15].
Next we’d like to engineer a set E ∈ V1 of ordinals all of whose members are greater
than ρ such that L[C ∪ E] |= CH. Since V1 is a model of the axiom of choice, there are
functions G and H with domains {α | ω ≤ α < (ℵ1)
V1} and {β | (ℵ1)
V1 ≤ β < (ℵ2)
V1},
respectively, such that for each α ∈ dom(G), Gα := G(α) is a bijection between α and ω,
and for each β ∈ dom(H), Hβ := H(β) is a bijection between β and (ℵ1)
V1 . Let κ and
π be fixed points of the function ξ 7→ ωξ such that κ < π and ρ, (ℵ1)
V1 , (ℵ2)
V1 < κ. Now
define
E1 := {κ
α · (1 + ξ) +Gα(ξ) | α ∈ dom(G) ∧ ξ < α}
E2 := {π
β · (1 + γ) +Hβ(γ) | β ∈ dom(H) ∧ γ < β}
E := E1 ∪ E2
where of course κα and πβ refer to the operation of ordinal exponentiation. Then E1∩E2 =
∅. Moreover, owing to the uniqueness of Cantor normal forms (e.g. [27, Theorem 8.4.4]),
for each α ∈ dom(G), Fα is definable from C ∪ E in L[C ∪ E] (using the parameter κ),
and likewise, for each β ∈ dom(H), Hβ is definable from C ∪ E in L[C ∪ E] (using the
parameter π). To elaborate on this, suppose α ∈ dom(G). Then for ξ < α search for the
least ordinal δ such that κα · (1 + ξ) + δ ∈ E. Necessarily, δ = Gα(ξ).
As a consequence of the above, we have
(ℵ1)
V1 = (ℵ1)
L[C ∪ E] ∧ (ℵ2)
V1 = (ℵ2)
L[C ∪ E] ∧ L[C ∪ E] |= CH. (14)
To see the latter, suppose that x ∈ L[C ∪E] and x is an infinite set of reals. As L[C ∪E]
is a model of AC, there is an ordinal η and a bijection ℓ ∈ L[C ∪ E] between x and η.
Since L[C ∪ E] ⊆ V1, η < (ℵ2)
V1 must obtain, and hence there is a bijection in L[C ∪ E]
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either between ω and x or between (ℵ1)
V1 = (ℵ1)
L[C ∪ E] and x. From (8) and (13), we also
conclude that
R
L[C] = RL[C ∪ E]. (15)
Utilizing the wellordering <L[C∪E] and (14), there exists a Σ
L[C ∪ E]
1 partial function g that
finds for each no-empty set of reals either a surjection of ω onto x or a surjection of x
onto RL[C] since being such a mapping f is a ∆0 property of f in the parameters x, ω and
R
L[C]. Thus there is a realizer d ∈ L[C ∪ E] such that d C ∪ E CH. From (12) and (6) it
then follows that (b)0 = 0, contradicting (10). In sum, a contradiction has been inferred
from (6). On account of Theorem 5.2, this implies that CH ∨ ¬CH is not provable in T.
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